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PROPERTY LAW FOR THE
ANTHROPOCENE ERA
John G. Sprankling*

Human activity has replacednature as the principalforce shaping our planet. As a
result, we stand at the dawn of a new geological epoch: the Anthropocene.
Fundamental changes in American law will be required to mitigate and adapt to
the negative environmental impacts produced in this new era. These changes will
go far beyond the traditionalscope of environmental law to encompass property
law and other subjects.
This Article analyzes how American property law should respond to the
Anthropocene challenge. It demonstrates the need to transitionfrom a property
law system based on stability to a more dynamic system that accommodates largescale environmental disruption. It argues that we must develop a new vision of
ownership in which property rights are more flexible and less categoricalthan in
the past, and that we must implement this transition in a manner that does not
violate the Takings Clause. The Article proposes four overarchingprinciples to
guide the evolution of our property law system in the coming decades.
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INTRODUCTION
The historic foundation of American property law is eroding. In 2016,
scientists officially acknowledged that we have entered a new geological epoch:
the Anthropocene.' This era is characterized by the reality that human activitynot nature-is the dominant force transforming the physical world. 2 The
magnitude and speed of this transformation are unprecedented in the history of our
planet.3 As a result, we must shift from a property law system premised on
stability to a more dynamic system that accommodates large-scale change. The
most important challenge confronting property law today is how to adjust to the
Anthropocene era in the coming decades.
Our property law system evolved over centuries when the physical
conditions affecting land were relatively stable. Changes produced by nature were
usually minor and gradual, while human impacts on the physical world were
limited and localized.4 The fee simple absolute and other property rights that
emerged in this environment, first in England and later in the United States,
reflected this stability. The temporal and spatial dimensions of these rights were
comparatively rigid; and the substantive content of these rights tended toward
absolutism, relatively free from government constraints. 5 Because these property

1.
See Damian Carrington, The Anthropocene Epoch: Scientists Declare Dawn
of Human-Influenced Age, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 29, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/

environment/2016/aug/29/declare-anthropocene-epoch-experts-urge-geological-congresshuman-impact-earth.
2.
Anthropocene, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2014).
3.
See JEREMY DAVIES, THE BIRTH OF THE ANTHROPOCENE 2-4 (2016); JR.
McNEILL & PETER ENGELKE, THE GREAT ACCELERATION: AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY OF
THE ANTHROPOCENE SINCE 1945, at 4-6 (2014).

4.

For discussions of gradual changes in the natural environment of Britain

before the Anthropocene epoch, see ROBIN H. BEST, LAND USE AND LIVING SPACE 10-13
(1981) and NEIL ROBERTS, THE HOLOCENE: AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY 143-53 (1989).
During the Anthropocene epoch, in contrast, human activity has disrupted the environment
to an unprecedented extent. See infra text accompanying notes 28-45.

5.

See infra text accompanying notes 64-85.
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systems developed in an era of stability, they did not include mechanisms that
could adjust property rights in response to major external changes.6
Today, at the dawn of the Anthropocene era, human activities have
already begun to change the Earth's climate, geology, and ecosystems. Since the
middle of the twentieth century, the human impact on our planet has accelerated
dramatically.7 For example, human-caused emissions of toxic substances have
contaminated large regions;8 greenhouse gases are changing the climate, causing
sea levels to rise; 9 desertification has transformed the planet's surface; 0 and many
non-human species are becoming extinct. " Scholars conventionally view legal
responses to developments like these as falling within the ambit of environmental
law. But this narrow view is outdated and counterproductive. The Anthropocene
era may endure for thousands of years 12 and will necessitate fundamental changes
in many areas of law, including property law.
In this new era, when humans are reshaping the natural world in
fundamental ways, our static property law system is increasingly obsolete. As the
world changes, the rights of different property owners will increasingly conflict,
and the respective rights of particular owners will collide with the rights of society
more frequently. Our property law system must be retooled to accommodate and
manage the conflicts that will arise in a rapidly changing world, but in a manner
that does not violate the Takings Clause. In fact, we have already begun to shift
toward a more dynamic system, at least in piecemeal fashion. 13 The current
challenge is to develop overarching principles that can guide the future evolution
of property law.
This Article explores how American property law will be transformed for
the Anthropocene era. Part I examines the challenge posed by the Anthropocenean era of extraordinary global change in terms of intensity, scale, and speed. Part II
explains how stable environmental conditions contributed to England's rigid
system of absolutist property rights, without mechanisms to accommodate
substantial change. Part III analyzes how American law developed doctrines that
inject a degree of flexibility into the static property law system inherited from
6.

See infra text accompanying notes 71-84.

&

7.
See Colin N. Waters et al., The Anthropocene is Functionally and
StratigraphicallyDistinctfrom the Holocene, 351 SCIENCE 2622-1 (2016); DAVIES, supra
note 3, at 2-4; McNEILL & ENGELKE, supra note 3, at 4-6.
8.
See McNEILL & ENGELKE, supra note 3, at 28-29; JOHN G. SPRANKLING
GREGORY S. WEBER, THE LAW OF HAZARDOUS WASTES AND Toxic SUBSTANCES IN A
NUTSHELL 3-4, 105-07, 273-76 (2d ed. 2007); Waters et al., supra note 7, at 2622-5.
9.
See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE
2014: SYNTHESIS REPORT 42 (2015); JERRY M. MELILLO ET AL., EDS., CLIMATE CHANGE
IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES: THE THIRD NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 582-83

(2014).
10.
11.
12.

See DAVID SHERIDAN, DESERTIFICATION IN THE UNITED STATES 121 (1981).
See Waters et al., supra note 7, at 2622-8.
The previous geological epoch, the Holocene, lasted for 12,000 years. See

JEDEDIAH PURDY, AFTER NATURE:

13.

See infra Part III.

A POLITICS FOR

THE ANTHROPOCENE 1

(2015).
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England. It also demonstrates how these doctrines can serve as the foundation for
future reforms in a manner that is consistent with the Takings Clause. Finally, Part
IV proposes broad principles to reshape property rights for the Anthropocene era
in four key areas: (1) exclusivity; (2) use; (3) time; and (4) geography.

I. THE ANTHROPOCENE CHALLENGE

"

A new word appeared in the venerable Oxford English Dictionary in
2014: Anthropocene, defined as "[t]he era of geological time during which human
activity is considered to be the dominant influence in the environment, climate,
and ecology of the Earth." 1 4 This designation received preliminary scientific
approval in 2016, when scientists recommended to the International Geological
Congress that the Anthropocene be designated as a new geological epoch.
Scholars agree that the Anthropocene should be viewed as a distinct
period in the history of the Earth. 16 Over the last 12,000 years, humans lived in the
Holocene epoch-an era when the Earth was predominately shaped by natural
forces. 1 7 But today, humans are the most important influence on the physical
condition of the planet. " Accordingly, the new epoch is named for us: the age of
humans.1 9 With hindsight, most authorities now place the beginning of the
Anthropocene in the mid-twentieth century. 20
From the geological perspective, the decision to recognize the
Anthropocene as a discrete period hinges on a technical question: "Have humans
changed the Earth system to such an extent that recent and currently forming
geological deposits include a signature that is distinct from those of the Holocene
and earlier epochs, which will remain in the geological record?" 21 There seems to
be a consensus that this standard is met. 2 2 The byproducts of mining, waste
disposal, construction, and urbanization "are accompanied by many new forms of
'rock,' in the broad sense of geological materials with the potential for long-term
persistence." 23 This is particularly true for deposits stemming from the Great
Acceleration of industrialization, population growth, and resource consumption
that began in the mid-twentieth century. 24 Plastics, pesticide residues, heavy metal
emissions, crop pollens, concrete, aluminum, mine tailings, fertilizers, radioactive
fallout from nuclear-weapons tests, particulates from fossil-fuel combustion,

14.

Anthropocene, supra note 2.

15.
16.

Carrington, supra note 1.
See, e.g., DAVIES, supra note 3; McNEILL & ENGELKE, supra note 3; PURDY,

supra note 12.

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

PURDY, supra note 12, at 1.
See Anthropocene, supra note 2.
DAVIES, supranote 3, at 6.
Carrington, supra note 1.
Waters et al., supra note 7, at 2622-1.
See Carrington,supra note 1.
Waters et al., supranote 7, at 2622-3.
Id. at 2622-1.
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chemical wastes, and other substances evidencing human activity have formed a
distinct geological layer that will persist for eons. 25
In a broader sense, scientific acceptance of the Anthropocene as a distinct
era marks the boundary between the first 4.5 billion years of the Earth's history,
when our planet was almost exclusively governed by natural forces, and the future,
when it will be predominantly shaped by human activity. Thus, the substantive
scope of the Anthropocene extends beyond geological change to encompass
humanity's impact on the climate, ecology, environment, and other aspects of the
natural world. 2 6 As Jedediah Purdy summarizes, "[t]he familiar divide between
people and the natural world is no longer useful or accurate. Because we shape
everything, from the upper atmosphere to the deep seas, there is no more nature
that stands apart from human beings." 2 7
Human activity has disrupted our planet's natural systems to an extent
that is unprecedented in intensity, speed, and scale. 28 The most prominent example
is humanity's impact on the climate system. Greenhouse-gas emissions have begun
to alter the global climate: 29 ice and snow are melting,3 0 sea levels are rising,3 1 the
oceans are acidifying, 3 2 drought is growing,3 3 wildfires are intensifying,34
freshwater flooding is increasing,3 5 diseases are spreading, 3 6 and agricultural
productivity is falling. 3 7 But climate change is merely one aspect of a larger
phenomenon: humans are broadly impairing the Earth's biological, chemical, and
physical systems.
Consider some of the negative impacts produced by the combination of
population growth, industrialization, and resource consumption, mainly over the
past 70 years. More than half of the Earth's surface has been transformed by
intensive human uses, most commonly for agriculture. 38 Excessive irrigation,
overgrazing, and poor farming practices have converted some formerly fertile
areas into artificial deserts. 39 Radioactivity from nuclear-weapons testing and
accidental releases have contaminated soils.4 0 Excessive removal of groundwater

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
McNEILL & ENGELKE, supra note 3, at 4-6.
PURDY, supra note 12, at 2-3.
DAVIES, supranote 3, at 2-4; McNEILL & ENGELKE, supra note 3, at 4-6.
MELILLO ET AL., supra note 9, at 7-9.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 9, at 2-4.
Id. at 42; MELILLO ET AL., supra note 9, at 582-83.
MELILLO ET AL., supranote 9, at 10.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

71-75.
177-78.
75.
222-25.
152-57.

38.
Waters et al., supranote 7, at 2622-3, 2622-8.
39.
SHERIDAN, supra note 10, at 121 (observing that millions of acres in the
United States suffer from severe desertification).
40.
McNEILL & ENGELKE, supra note 3, at 28-29; Waters et al., supra note 7, at
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has caused widespread subsidence. 4 1 Over the last century, increasing fertilizer use
has doubled the levels of nitrogen and phosphorous in soils, producing run-off that
imperils aquatic life.4 2 Billions of pounds of toxic chemicals are released into the
environment each year, contaminating soils and drinking water.4 3 Transboundary
air pollution by particulate matter, heavy metals, and other contaminants causes
injuries thousands of miles away from emission sites.4 4 The increasing eradication
of non-human species signals the sixth mass-extinction event in the Earth's
history; 75% of non-human species may be extinct within a few centuries. 4 5
More importantly, the pace of these Anthropocene transformations is
accelerating. 46 The Holocene epoch and its predecessors were characterized by
gradualism. Over tens of thousands of years, change occurred slowly: sea levels
fluctuated, glaciers inched, and temperatures varied. 4 7 By contrast, the rate of
human-caused change during the Anthropocene has soared. 48 Humans have
transformed the planet more in the last 70 years than nature did in the prior 10,000
years, causing a cascade of cumulative changes. 4 9 For example, since 1950, the
world's use of nitrogen fertilizer has increased by 2,500%, while the production of
plastics has increased by 30,000%.5o Both have caused major harm to the world's
oceans.5 1 While humanity's capacity to modify conditions on a planetary scale will
undoubtedly increase in the future, we cannot predict the precise scope and
intensity of the adverse changes that will occur as we move toward a post-natural
world. The only certainty is that major reforms to our legal system will be
necessary, including new approaches to property law.
The Anthropocene era poses challenges in four main areas that will affect
land ownership-and accordingly, impact our property law system. First, external
forces may have adverse physical impacts on a particular parcel of land that
prevent use of the land for its historic or anticipated function, whether it be for
agricultural, industrial, residential, or other purposes. This use-elimination scenario
might be caused by widespread flooding, toxic contamination, desertification,
excessive temperature, or other factors. In this context, we must develop
mechanisms to modify the owner's property rights or to adapt the parcel for new
uses, potentially over the owner's objection.

41.
See, e.g., Lisa M. Krieger, California Drought: Parts of Central Valley
Sinking 2 Inches a Month, MERCURY NEWs (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.mercurynews.com/

2015/08/19/california-drought-parts-of-central-valley-sinking-2-inches-a-month/.
42.
Waters et al., supra note 7, at 2622-4.
43.
SPRANKLING &WEBER, supra note 8, at 3-4, 105-07, 273-76.
44.
Agnieszka Galuszka et al., Assessing the Anthropocene with Geochemical
Methods, in A STRATIGRAPHICAL BASIS FOR THE ANTHROPOCENE 221, 231 (C.N. Waters et

al., eds., 2014).
45.
Waters et al., supranote 7, at 2622-8.
46.
McNEILL & ENGELKE, supra note 3, at 4-5.
47.
See PURDY, supra note 12, at 1; ROBERTS, supra note 4, at 62-64, 88.
48.
See supra text accompanying notes 38-46.
49.
See supratext accompanying notes 38-46.
50.
McNEILL & ENGELKE, supra note 3, at 4-5.
51.

Id.
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Second, external forces may create off-site conditions under which it
becomes substantially more difficult-though not impossible-to use land for its
normal purpose, especially when the rights of owners conflict. This use-reduction
scenario could be caused by physical changes that preclude or hamper access to
the parcel; a shortage of water due to pollution, drought, or groundwater depletion;
or other factors. In this situation, we will need novel approaches to mediate the
conflicting claims of different owners.
Third, activities on a piece of land may cause or contribute to crossborder physical changes that substantially harm other parcels, in either a direct or
cumulative sense. This negative-externality scenario might arise from activities
such as deforestation, air or water pollution, flooding, or uncontrolled fires. In this
scenario, it will be necessary to develop innovative techniques to restrict and
potentially prohibit certain land uses to prevent or mitigate off-site impacts, even if
this impairs traditional property rights.
Finally, the preservation of a particular parcel in its natural condition may
help to mitigate general Anthropocene impacts that would harm other parcels or
society in general. This mitigation-value scenario would apply, for example, where
forest land serves as a "sink" to absorb carbon dioxide to mitigate climate change
or where a wetland parcel provides habitat for an endangered species. In this
situation, techniques that discourage or prevent owners from destroying the
mitigation value of their lands-through development or otherwise-will be
needed.
Contemporary property law is not equipped to deal with these challenges.
This law evolved in an era that was characterized by relatively stable physical
conditions, when there was no need to accommodate negative external forces on a
large scale. Accordingly, it failed to develop robust mechanisms that could
restructure property rights in response to systemic changes in the physical world.
Even so, our property law tradition contains doctrines that can serve as raw
material to develop overarching principles that respond to the Anthropocene era.

II. THE ENGLISH PROPERTY LAW FOUNDATION
A. Static Conception of Property
Utilitarian theory justifies the existence of private property as necessary
to maximize the overall utility of all citizens. 52 In this sense, the goal is to allocate
and define property rights in the manner that best promotes the general welfare of
the entire society. More specifically, Richard Posner and other law and economics
scholars view property law as a mechanism to allocate finite resources in an
efficient, market-driven manner. From this perspective, strong property rights are

52.

See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & EDUARDO M. PETALVER, AN INTRODUCTION
17 (2012).
See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONoMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw (9th ed.

TO PROPERTY THEORY

53.
2014).
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vital. Each entitlement must be perpetual in duration54 and absolute in scope; the
owner must be able to exclude others from the land; and state interference with the
owner's use should be minimal.
Under these circumstances, Posner would argue that (1) owners enjoy
sufficient stability of title to invest in enhancing the productivity of their lands for
the benefit of all citizens and (2) the free transferability of title ensures that land is
devoted to its highest and best use.56 The property-rights system that emerges from
this model functions best in an unchanging world-one where stability is prized at
the expense of flexibility. In such a setting, there is no need for government action
to adjust or reallocate property rights.
With hindsight, we can see that this model somewhat describes the final
stage in the evolution of English property law. It is axiomatic that physical
conditions, such as geography and climate, influence how law evolves.5 7 This is
particularly true in the development of property law, which historically dealt
almost exclusively with rights in land." English property law developed over
centuries of relative stability, largely free from the threat of environmental changes
caused by human or non-human forces. 5 9 Humans did not have the ability to harm
the Earth's biological, climate, chemical, or physical systems on a planetary scale
in a manner that impaired property rights. Moreover, the era was characterized by
a lack of major change caused by natural forces, such as extreme temperature
variations, glacial movement, or flooding.60 As a result, the property law system
that emerged was primarily characterized by rigidity and absolutism.
B. Rigidity and Absolutism
Thousands of years ago, England was a wilderness, mainly covered by
forests. Yet by 1086 A.D., most of this wilderness had disappeared due to human
activity, as recorded in the famous Domesday Book.6 1 Even before Europeans
discovered North America, virtually the entire land surface in England was in
productive agricultural use as cropland, pasture, woodlot, or the like.6 2 During the

54.

As Robert Ellickson observes, the ideal property entitlement has an "infinite

time-horizon." Robert C. Ellickson, The Costs of Complex Land Titles: Two Examples from
China, 1 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROPER. RTs. CONF. J. 281, 293 (2012).
55.
POSNER, supra note 53, at 40-42.

56.
57.
(1984).

Id. at 78-84.
See, e.g., Bernhard Grossfeld, Geography and Law, 82

58.

See JOHN G. SPRANKLING,

59.
60.

See supra note 4.
See supra note 4.

61.

A

UNDERSTANDING

MICH.

PROPERTY LAW

L. REv. 1510
11 (4th ed.

2017).

NEW HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF ENGLAND

ed., 1973).

62.

BEST, supra note

4, at 14.

39, 47-62 (Henry C. Darby
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period between roughly 1400 and 1776, there was little change in the physical
landscape, aside from a gradual reduction of forests. 63
Because the landscape remained virtually static for centuries, the English
conception of property was largely designed to perpetuate the status quo, decade
after decade.6 4 Accordingly, it was not an approach that facilitated adaptation to
major changes in external environmental conditions. The English system implicitly
assumed that no fundamental shifts in regional conditions would occur over
time-the soil would always be productive, rain would regularly fall, flooding
would be rare, and the climate would remain relatively constant.65 In sum, the core
aspects of property rights under English law were static.
For example, English law conceptualized the fee simple absolute, the
principal estate in land, as endless. 6 6 The main involuntary limitation on the
duration of this estate was adverse possession. 6 7 If 0 owned a fee simple absolute
in Blackacre, but failed to place the land in productive use, he or she might lose
title to the adverse possessor who did put the land to use. But as a general rule,
property rights were seen as perpetual. 68 English courts had no power to curtail the
infinite duration of these rights.
Moreover, English law declared the geographic position that a fee simple
absolute encompassed-its boundaries on the land surface, its airspace, and its
subsoil-to be equally changeless. 69 The vertical and horizontal dimensions of O's
estate in Blackacre would endure forever, unless 0 or O's successors consented to
change. 0 literally owned all the airspace "to the heavens," all of the subsurface

63.
JOHN PERLIN, A FOREST JOURNEY: THE ROLE OF WOOD IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF CIVILIZATION 163-227 (1989).
John G. Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law, 63
64.
U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 524-25 (1996).

65.

In this sense, the English property law system rested on an assumption of

stationarity the concept that "natural systems fluctuate within an unchanging envelope of
variability." P.C.D. Milly et al., Stationarity is Dead: Whither Water Management?, 319
SCIENCE 573, 573 (2008). In the Anthropocene era, the concept of stationarity is by
definition-increasingly irrelevant.
66.
See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 14 (AM. LAW INST. 1936); 2 THOMPSON
ON REAL PROPERTY § 17.02 (David A. Thomas ed., 2014). The same assumption
underpinned the doctrine of ameliorative waste, under which any change in the natural
condition of land by a tenant was deemed to be unlawful waste-even if it increased the
market value of the land.
67.
See, e.g., Limitation Act 1623, 21 Jac. I, c. 16 (Eng.).
68.
Indeed, English law even accepted various forms of speculative future
interests that might, in theory, endure forever, such as the reversion, right of entry, and
possibility of reverter. Only the infamous Rule Against Perpetuities provided a partial check
on the infinite duration of future interests.
69.
Blackstone's famous eighteenth-century treatise on English law illustrates
the point. Although it devotes over 300 pages to summarizing English property law, the
only doctrines it mentions for modifying the dimensions of a particular parcel without the
owner's consent deal with the movement of water-based boundaries, such as where a stream
gradually shifts its course. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *262.

746

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

"to the center of the earth,"
Blackacre boundaries.

70

[VOL. 59:737

and the entire land surface enclosed within the

The corollary of this static conception was an absolutist view of property
rights. Thus, Blackstone grandly defined property as "that sole and despotic
dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the
world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe." 7 1 0,
as the owner of Blackacre, had the absolute right to exclude any person from the
land. In a similar vein, 0 had the virtually unfettered right to use the land in any
way he or she saw fit-or not to use it at all. 72 Land use was essentially viewed as
a private matter, not a public concern.
Yet English property law was not wholly static. Over time, the resilient
common law developed various exceptions to the rigid and absolutist approach.
Exceptions arose because property entitlements that were too strong might impair
the productive use of land in certain situations. These exceptions generally shared
the feature of preventing or limiting voluntary human actions that would impede
productivity. For instance, English law banned total restraints on alienation of a fee
simple absolute 73 and restricted the duration of contingent future interests to
enhance marketability and hence, productive use. 74 Similarly, the law slowly
recognized that certain types of easements could be created without the affirmative
75
consent of the servient owner to ensure reasonable use of the dominant parcel.
One reason that the English system functioned adequately for centuries is
that human activity rarely caused negative impacts to owners, so conflicts were
rare. 76 Where conflicts did occur, the controversy could usually be mediated by the
77
nuisance doctrine, another exception that mitigated the rigidity of the system.
Courts would intervene where one owner's land use produced a serious negative
externality-a nontrespassory and substantial interference with another owner's
use. 78 Another occasional problem-land subsidence due to activities by another
owner-simply reinforced the traditional static rule: each owner was entitled to the
lateral and subjacent support of his or her property, as long as it remained in its

70.

See, e.g., John G. Sprankling, Owning the Center of the Earth, 55 UCLA L.

REv. 979, 982-89 (2008).
71.
2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 69, at *2.
72.
The principal limitation on this right was adverse possession. If 0 failed to
place Blackacre in productive use, he or she might well lose title to a long-term trespasser
who did put the land to productive use.
73.
See SPRANKLING, supranote 58, at 134.
74.
Id. at 204.
75.
2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 69, at *264.
76.
One indication that such conflicts were rare is the late evolution of the
nuisance doctrine. Until the sixteenth century, a property owner could not bring a civil
nuisance action against another owner. WILLIAM L. PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 618 (5th ed. 1984). This suggests that there was little or
no need for such a doctrine in prior decades.
77.
See SPRANKLING, supra note 58, at 503-04.
78.
Id. at 503.
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natural, undeveloped condition.79 As a general rule, each parcel of land was treated
as an island rather than part of an integrated regional landscape because conflicts
between landowners were unusual.so Accordingly, there was no pressure on the
English legal system to adopt new doctrines to reconcile and accommodate the
conflicting interests of property owners.
The second important factor in the perpetuation of this approach was the
absence of adverse impacts caused by non-human factors, such as environmental
changes on a large scale. Major changes in climate, geography, topography, and
other natural background conditions that had a substantial negative effect on a
landowner almost never occurred." During the formative period of English
property law, the physical conditions that affected property rights were relatively
stable. As a result, there was no need to develop legal doctrines that could respond
to major environmental shifts. The principal exception to this was the risk that a
water boundary between parcels could move over time, as streams or other bodies
of water may change location. The common-law solution was the distinction
between accretion and avulsion.8 2 A water-based boundary line would move due to
accretion-i.e., when the stream or other body of water slowly shifted due to the
gradual build-up of soil. 83 But a boundary line would not move due to avulsioni.e., when there was a sudden and permanent change in the location of the body of
water, usually due to a flood or other major event.84 Thus, when a water boundary
changed due to accretion, the geographic location of the land subject to an estate
also changed.
In sum, the property law system that evolved in England was
characterized by rigidity and absolutism. As a general rule, English courts had no
ability to fundamentally readjust property rights. Yet when property rights actually
conflicted in a significant manner due to unusual local conditions, doctrines such
as nuisance and accretion injected a trace of flexibility into the system.

III. THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN PROPERTY LAW
A. Inching Toward a More Dynamic System
As legal historian Morton Horwitz summarized, the English view of
property that the newly independent United States inherited was a "static
agricultural conception,"" which was designed to perpetuate the status quo decade
after decade. It implicitly assumed that neither human activity nor the forces of
nature would necessitate major changes to property rights in the future. Over the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, American courts began to adjust
79.
80.
76, at 618.
81.

82.
83.
84.
85.

at 31 (1977).

See, e.g., Harris v. Ryding, 151 Eng. Rep. 27 (Ex. 1839).
See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 69, at *261; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
See supranote 4.
2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 69.

Id.
Id.
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw 1780-1860,
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English property law to meet the needs of a nation bent on developing its
wilderness lands through changes such as rejecting the ameliorative-waste
doctrine.86 Yet the core rigidity and absolutism of English property law remained
in place. Property rights were generally viewed as rigid in both geography and
time; 87 courts enforced the owner's virtually absolute right to exclude;" and
government interference with private land-use decisions was rare.8 9
Over time, however, American courts began to modify the traditional
property rights of landowners in response to pressure from human forces, in the
interest of social and economic development. For example, as the Supreme Court
explained in the 1926 decision of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., the rapid
urbanization and population growth of the era necessitated "additional restrictions
in respect of the use and occupation of private lands in urban
communities . . [that] a century ago, or even half a century ago, probably would
have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive." 9 0 Accordingly, American courts
and legislatures began to develop new, more flexible property law doctrines that
could accommodate conflicts between property owners. 91 The historic approach
began to fray somewhat in response to these human-caused impacts.
B. Embryonic Flexibility Themes
In the twentieth century, new legal tools emerged to adjust property rights
under limited circumstances. The external pressures generating change were minor
compared to the eventual impacts of the Anthropocene era, and the scope of these
tools was accordingly narrow. Yet these doctrines can serve as seeds for the
evolution of broader themes, providing helpful precedents for the more daunting
task of developing principles to reshape property rights for the Anthropocene era
in four key dimensions: (1) the right to exclude; (2) the right to use; (3) time limits;
and (4) geographic limits.
In fact, Anthropocene era pressures have already affected American
property law to some extent, principally by constraining land use. 9 2 As we
reexamine what we belatedly recognize as the first portion of the Anthropocene,
patterns in these legal changes begin to emerge. New statutes and decisions that
curtailed the scope and content of traditional ownership rights were often seen as
developments within the newly created field of environmental law. 93 Yet, to the

See generally Sprankling, supra note 64.
86.
87.
The principal exception was the abolition of fee tail, done primarily for
ideological reasons.
88.
In recent decades, however, the trespass doctrine has been curtailed for
public policy reasons. See SPRANKLING, supranote 58, at 518.
89.
Comprehensive zoning ordinances were not adopted in the United States
until the 1920s. See id. at 629. Before this era, "[1]egislation restricting land use was both
rare and fragmentary." Id.
272 U.S. 365, 386-87 (1926).
90.
91.
See infra text accompanying notes 95-143.
92.
See, e.g., text accompanying notes 121-23.
93.
For example, the Endangered Species Act (the Act), 16 U.S.C §§ 1531-1543
(2012), is conventionally seen as environmental law. See, e.g., PHILIP WEINBERG & KEVIN
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extent that these changes affected property rights, they are more appropriately
viewed as property law. 94 With hindsight, we can discern how property law has
been altered since the mid-twentieth century by incremental responses to major
human impacts on the natural environment.
1. The Right to Exclude
American property law constrains the absolutism of the traditional
common-law right to exclude through legislative and judicial action in a variety of
situations, ranging from landlord-tenant law to easements to flood water to
groundwater rights. The flexibility doctrines in this category are linked by the
common theme of equitable sharing. Rather than strictly enforcing the right to
exclude, the law mandates that affected parties share the resource-at least in
certain situations-based on equitable principles.
In the landlord-tenant context, for example, the federal Fair Housing Act
bars a landlord from refusing to rent a dwelling to a tenant based on race, gender,
national origin, or other protected categories. 95 Similarly, the modern trend in case
law is that commercial landlords can no longer refuse an assignment or sublease in
their sole discretion where the lease requires landlord consent, but does not specify
a standard; rather, landlords may exclude the new tenant only if they have a
96
commercially reasonable objection.
Another illustration is the American expansion of the English law
governing nonconsensual easements, effectively allowing the benefited owner to
obtain an easement over the objection of the servient owner. 97 In effect, both
owners share the servient land to some extent. Familiar examples include the
prescriptive easement, 9 8 the implied easement based on preexisting use, 99 the
easement by necessity, 100 and most recently, the easement by estoppel.101 In each
A. REILLY, UNDERSTANDING ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 378-81 (3d ed. 2013) (discussing the
Act as an environmental-law doctrine). But the Act substantially curtails the ability of
property owners to develop lands that serve as the habitat for endangered species. See, e.g.,
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995)
(upholding regulation promulgated under the Act which effectively banned logging in
certain privately-owned forests to protect habitat of endangered species).
94.
"The boundary line between property law and environmental law is
imprecise-and perhaps nonexistent. Many environmental-law doctrines affect how
property can be used; and property law concepts are sometimes applied to solve
environmental problems." JOHN G. SPRANKLING & RAYMOND C. COLETTA, PROPERTY: A
CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 857 (3d ed. 2013).

95.

42 U.S.C.

§§ 3601-3631 (2012).

96.
See, e.g., Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 709 P.2d 837 (Cal. 1985).
97.
For example, the easement-by-necessity doctrine under English law required,
inter alia, strict necessity. See, e.g., Collins v. Prentice, 15 Conn. 39, 43-44 (1842)
(discussing the strict necessity requirement in English law). Many American states have
now liberalized this requirement.
98.
See, e.g., O'Dell v. Stegall, 703 S.E.2d 561 (W. Va. 2010).
99.
See, e.g., Van Sandt v. Royster, 83 P.2d 698 (Kan. 1938).

100.

See, e.g., Berge v. Vermont, 915 A.2d 189 (2006).

101.

See, e.g., Kienzle v. Myers, 853 N.E.2d 1203 (Ohio App. 2006).
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instance, the strong public policy favoring the productive use of land predominates
over the servient owner's right to exclude-even though he or she receives no
compensation for the new encumbrance. Indeed, the current trend to expand the
scope of the easement-by-necessity doctrine by requiring only reasonable
necessity-an easement which is beneficial or convenient to the dominant
owner-demonstrates that the scope of the right to exclude is narrowing. 102
The law governing freshwater flooding is another example. Many
American courts initially adopted the common-enemy approach to diffuse surface
water, under which owners were permitted to exclude flood water from their lands
by any manner, even if this caused injury to lands owned by others.103 Yet today
most states 104 have jettisoned this approach in favor of the reasonable-use
standard, under which owners may not exclude flood water through an
unreasonable use of their lands. o
The same equitable-sharing approach is also seen in principles for
allocating subsurface resources-such as water, oil, and natural gas-by which
each owner of land over a common pool is entitled to extract a reasonable share of
the resource. For example, some states follow the correlative-rights approach to
groundwater ownership, under which each owner of land overlying an aquifer is
entitled to a fair share of the groundwater below.106 Similarly, most states with
extensive oil and gas production have adopted the correlative-rights system: 107
each owner is entitled to a fair share of the oil and gas under his or her land.
Indeed, most states utilize forced pooling statutes, which allow an owner whose
correlative oil or gas entitlement is threatened by the operation of another owner's
well to share in the production from that well.10s
An equitable-sharing regime also applies to some extent to rights in
surface water. Under the riparian approach, predominating in the eastern United
States,1 09 the right of a riparian owner to withdraw water from a river or other
watercourse is limited. The owner is only entitled to water that he or she uses in a
reasonable manner, considering the needs of other riparian owners.110 Similarly,
under the prior-appropriation doctrine, generally predominating in the western
United States,"' a person who diverts water from a watercourse obtains property
rights only when the water is devoted to a beneficial use, such as agricultural,

102.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 2.15 (AM. LAW
2000).
103.
See, e.g., Yonadi v. Homestead Country Homes, 127 A.2d 198 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1956).
104.
See SPRANKLING, supra note 58, at 533.
105.
See, e.g., Westland Skating Ctr., Inc. v. Gus Machado Buick, Inc., 542 So. 2d
959 (Fla. 1989).
106.
See, e.g., Olson v. City of Wahoo, 248 N.W. 304, 308 (Neb. 1933).
107.
See, e.g., Eliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1948).
108.
See, e.g., 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 408 (2008).
109.
See SPRANKLING, supra note 58, at 530.
110.
See, e.g., Mason v. Hoyle, 14 A. 786 (Conn. 1888).
111.
See SPRANKLING, supra note 58, at 530.
INST.
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industrial, or municipal use. 112 Although the reasonable-use and beneficial-use
standards differ somewhat, both share the same core: the amount of water taken
cannot unreasonably injure other water users.
Finally, an early Anthropocene era modification to the absolutist view of
exclusivity is found in the modern case law dealing with subsurface trespass. A
number of courts refuse to impose trespass liability when water or other materials
injected into the subsurface to facilitate oil recovery intrude into the subsurface
below adjacent properties.1 13 Some courts have taken the same approach to
trespass by liquid wastes which are injected underground for storage, but migrate
over time into subsurface regions owned by others. For example, in Chance v. BP
Chemicals, Inc., the Ohio Supreme Court rejected such a trespass claim, observing
that "ownership rights in today's world are not so clear-cut as they were before the
advent of airplanes and injection wells." 1 1 4
2. The Right to Use

"

The twentieth century radically transformed the absolutist common-law
approach to land use, beginning with the widespread enactment of local zoning
ordinances in the United States in the 1920s."' Historically, the manner in which a
landowner chose to use property was a private matter, 1 1 6 except in the rare instance
where a nuisance arose. 117 However, with the industrialization, population growth,
and urbanization of the early twentieth century, the danger of negative externalities
increased. Early zoning ordinances regulated where a particular use could be
located in the interest of preventing nuisance-like impacts in a more
comprehensive manner than case-by-case adjudication.
Over decades, however, zoning evolved into a robust system of
generalized land-use regulation, 1 1 9 serving new purposes such as protecting
property values, preserving neighborhood character, encouraging economic
development, and preventing environmental degradation.1 20 Additionally, in
response to early Anthropocene era impacts, federal statutes imposed a layer of
land-use regulation, ranging from the Clean Air Act 2 1 to the Endangered Species
Act, 122 which in many cases were supplemented by state statutes. 123 Today it is

112.
See, e.g., New Mexico ex rel. Office of State Eng'r v. United States, 296
P.3d 1217, 1222 (App. 2012), cert. denied, 299 P.3d 862 (2013).
113.
See, e.g., Raymond v. Union Tex. Petroleum Corp., 697 F. Supp. 270 (E.D.
La. 1988); Baumgarner v. Gulf Oil Corp., 168 N.W.2d 510 (Neb. 1969).
114.
670 N.E.2d 985, 992 (Ohio 1996).
115.
See SPRANKLING, supra note 58, at 629-31.
Id. at 628.
116.
117.
Id. at 500.
118.
Id. at 631-32.
119.
See Zwiefelhofer v. Town of Cooks Valley, 809 N.W.2d 362 (Wis. 2012)
(discussing differences between zoning and land-use regulation).
120.
Id. at 368-69.
121.
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2012).
122.
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2012).
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universally acknowledged that the police power affords government broad power
to restrict land use by private owners.
At the local level, it is axiomatic that both cities and counties may
prohibit certain land uses altogether and regulate how permitted uses are
implemented. For example, if 0 owns an undeveloped 50-acre tract called
Greenacre, a county ordinance may restrict its use to farming and raising livestock,
thus prohibiting 0 from engaging in more intensive uses such as housing or
industry. Similarly, if industrial use is permitted on Greenacre, local law may
restrict the location, height, size, square footage, parking, noise emissions,
operating hours, visual appearance, and other aspects of O's factory.
In addition, a variety of federal statutes adopted to serve environmental
goals in response to Anthropocene pressures are implemented through land-use
restrictions. Together these statutes constitute what may be viewed as a body of
federal property law. For example, the Clean Water Act 1" imposes limitations on
whether O's factory may emit wastes into navigable waters, while the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Actl25 may
force 0 to clean up past toxic contamination on Greenacre.
Finally, various legal doctrines might be used to prohibit any construction
on Greenacre, thus ensuring that it remains in natural condition. For example, if
Greenacre consists of wetlands, the public-trust doctrine 2 6 and the federal Clean
Water Act will probably prevent any construction on the land. Similarly, the
federal Endangered Species Act may prevent construction if this would harm
endangered or threatened species that use Greenacre as habitat. 127
In sum, the theme linking these examples is that government today has
wide power to regulate private land use. However, the ultimate constraint on this
power is the Takings Clause.
3. Time Limits
American property law imposes time limits in special situations on
otherwise infinite property rights. Thus, to some degree the law recognizes that the
duration of a particular right may be curtailed over the owner's objection for
utilitarian reasons, without any obligation to compensate the owner. England
recognized this concept through the adverse-possession doctrine, which terminated

123.
See, e.g., California Endangered Species Act, CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§
2050-2089 (2013).
124.
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1388 (2012).
125.
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2012).
126.
See, e.g., Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
127.
Under the Act, it is illegal to "take" an endangered species in the United
States without a permit. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2012). Land development that
eliminates habitat areas for an endangered species is an illegal taking of that species, absent
a permit. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Oregon,
515 U.S. 687 (1995).
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the rights of the idle owner and vested title in the industrious squatter. 1 28 But
American law has progressed well beyond this point.
Consider the impact of the recording acts. 129 Assume 0 conveys a fee
simple absolute in Blackacre to A, who fails to record or take possession of the
property for two years; 0 then conveys to B. If B is a bona fide purchaser for value
who records first, all jurisdictions assign title to B due to the important policy
goals that the recording acts serve. As a result, the duration of A's fee simple
absolute is reduced to two years by operation of law.
Another example is the marketable title acts adopted in many states. 130 if
an owner has a clear record chain of title back to a root of title, such as a deed, for
a period varying between 20 and 40 years in different states, then the owner's title
is deemed to be free and clear of all rights or interests that were recorded before
the root of title. Thus, if E records both a private easement and a restrictive
covenant burdening Blackacre, but fails to re-record them within the statutory
period after B obtains title, the law will nullify these rights.
Involuntary time limits on property rights appear in a variety of other
contexts. A city can terminate a nonconforming use without any obligation to pay
compensation as long as a sufficiently long amortization period is permitted-for
example, normally three to five years for a billboard.1 3 1 Similarly, a restrictive
land-use covenant cannot be enforced as an equitable servitude if conditions in the
neighborhood have changed so much that the benefits of the covenant can no
longer be obtained. 132 In effect, whether by direct regulation, involuntary
relinquishment, or changed circumstances, many time limits are imposed on
otherwise infinite property rights.
4. GeographicLimits
American law imposes new geographic limits on property rights in some
instances, again typically without any compensation to the affected owner. This
trend is evident in modern restrictions on the vertical and horizontal dimensions of
land ownership, which go far beyond the English doctrine of accretion.
For example, the classic view was that the landowner's title extended
upward "to the heavens."1 3 3 American courts regularly espoused this absolutist
view of airspace ownership until the invention of the airplane. It became apparent
that this approach would effectively prohibit air travel because it was impossible to
obtain every landowner's consent each time an airplane flew over private land. In
this new environment, as the Supreme Court remarked in United States v. Causby,

53
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See supranote 67.
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See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1214 (2007).
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See Walter E. Barnett, Marketable Title Acts Panacea or Pandemonium?,
REV. 45, 46-47 (1967).
See, e.g., Grant v. Mayor of Baltimore, 129 A.2d 363 (Md. 1957).
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the ancient doctrine that the surface owner held title to the heavens had "no place
in the modern world." 1 34 Instead, the Court explained, the surface owner "owns at
least as much of the space above the ground as he can occupy or use in connection
with the land." 1 3 5
Similarly, American law has begun to restrict the geographic scope of an
owner's title to the subsurface. Traditional theory proclaimed that title extended
downward from the surface to the "center of the earth." 1 36 But some decisions
suggest that-by analogy to airspace-the owner's title is limited to the land he or
she can effectively use. As a New York court summarized in Boehringer v.
Montalto, "the title of an owner of the soil will not be extended to a depth below
ground beyond which the owner may not reasonably make use thereof." 1 3 7
One hallmark of the early Anthropocene era was the further de facto
reduction of the geographic limits of the fee simple absolute as to both the airspace
and the subsurface by eliminating the only known economic use for these regions:
waste disposal. For example, a series of federal statutes-beginning with the
landmark 1970 amendments to the federal Clean Air Act-were adopted to combat
different forms of widespread air pollution, ranging from criteria pollutants such as
sulfur dioxide, to ozone-depleting chemicals such as CFCs, to greenhouse gases. 138
These statutes heavily regulate or abolish the owner's right to emit gases into
airspace. Likewise, laws in some regions restrict the burning of wood, crop waste,
and other combustibles, sometimes even to the point of banning home
fireplaces. 139 In a parallel manner, similar pressures reduced the rights of the
surface owner to emit wastes into the subsurface. Other than mineral exploitation,
the principal potential use for deep subsurface areas is as a site for the disposal of
various industrial wastes-most commonly, toxic and hazardous substances that
are expensive to store on the surface. If surface owners truly owned title "to the
center of the earth," as the common-law mantra indicated, they should be able to
freely inject such wastes. But since the 1980s, the federal Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act 40 and Safe Drinking Water Act 41 have prohibited such
injections as a general matter. The stringency of these new geographic limits was
mitigated by the creation of a new de facto form of property rights: governmental
permits to emit into the airspace or subsurface. Rather than retaining the broad
common-law right to use these regions as the owner wishes, the law authorized
emissions only under narrow conditions.
The geographic scope of the owner's rights to the land surface is also
impacted by modern law. The principal doctrines governing land boundaries-

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
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140.
141.

328 U.S. 256, 260-61 (1946).
Id. at 264
2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 69, at *18.
254 N.Y.S. 276, 278 (Spec. Term. 1931).
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2012).
See, e.g., Bay Area Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. Reg. 6-3-306, Requirements for
Construction (2015).
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6922 (2012).
42 U.S.C. § 300f-j (2012).
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agreed boundary line, acquiescence, and estoppel-effectively transfer title from
one owner to another in limited situations.142 The law governing encroachments
provides another illustration. Suppose that A builds his or her home in a manner
that encroaches on land owned by neighbor B. If A acted in good faith, the court
will refuse to order that the encroaching portion be removed, effectively
transferring title to the disputed land from B to A. 1 4 3 Both vertically and
horizontally, then, American law imposes new restrictions on the geographic rights
of owners with no compensation.
C. Dynamism and the Takings Clause
The ultimate limit on our ability to reshape property rights for the
Anthropocene era is the Takings Clause: government may not take private
property without just compensation. 14 4 Unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court
jurisprudence interpreting this clause generally reflects the historic view that
property rights are rigid and absolute. 145 However, as discussed above, American
courts and legislatures have adjusted property rights for decades without any
serious argument that those changes violated the Clause. Accordingly, new
techniques for modifying property rights that are rooted in existing legal
doctrines-like those discussed above-are more likely to survive constitutional
scrutiny than those that are not. Yet the circumstances under which a substantial
readjustment of property rights would constitute a taking remain somewhat
unclear.
It is well-settled that executive or legislative action may constitute a
regulatory taking under some circumstances. But the outer limits of this doctrine
remain notoriously murky. The total and immediate abrogation of a core property
right would almost certainly be a taking. For example, in Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, the Supreme Court held that the Army Corps of Engineers engaged in a
taking where it effectively converted a privately owned pond into a public aquatic
park because it wholly eliminated the "fundamental" right to exclude. 146 Eight
years later, in Hodel v. Irving, the Court determined that legislation which
abolished Native Americans' right to pass on their property by devise or descent
constituted a taking. 147 Calling the legislation "extraordinary," the Court stressed

142.
See SPRANKLING, supra note 58, at 537-38.
143.
See, e.g., Proctor v. Huntington, 238 P.3d 1117 (Wash. 2010).
144.
"[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. For a general discussion of Supreme Court
decisions on environmental issues relating to land ownership, see JONATHAN Z. CANNON,
ENVIRONMENT IN THE BALANCE: THE GREEN MOVEMENT AND THE SUPREME COURT 200-30
(2015).
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that it entirely abrogated a right that had been "part of the Anglo-American legal
system since feudal times." 1 48
The Court returned to this theme five years later, this time examining a
substantial restriction on the right to use. Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastal Council
involved a South Carolina statute enacted to protect life and property, which
effectively precluded the plaintiff from building homes on two lots he owned. 149
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia acknowledged that the scope of property
rights could be altered by legislation-at least to some extent-without
compensation. In particular, he observed that a property owner "necessarily
expects the uses of his property to be restricted, from time to time, by various
measures newly enacted by the State in legitimate exercise of its police powers." 5 0
Conversely, if a regulation proscribed "all economically beneficial use of land," as
it did in this case, Scalia reasoned that it would be a taking, unless justified by preexisting principles of property or nuisance law.1"' Justice Stevens, in dissent,
lamented that the majority's approach denied the legislature's "traditional power to
revise the law governing the rights and uses of property."1 52 Yet Scalia's approach
implicitly acknowledged that new legislation grounded in traditional principles of
property law would not be a taking, even if it eliminated all economic use.
The Scalia-Stevens dispute in Lucas resurfaced 18 years later in Stop the
Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection,
where the issue was whether judicial action that allegedly eliminated two minor
property rights could constitute a taking.153 The case is notable for two reasons.
First, a majority of the Court agreed that judicial action which eliminates or
substantially impairs an "established property right" 15 4 would violate the
Constitution, though some justices reached this result under the Takings Clause 55
while others did so under the Due Process Clause. 156
Second, the decision revealed substantial disagreement about the
permissible outer limits of judicial adjustment of property rights. In his plurality
opinion, Justice Scalia proclaimed that if a court "declares that what was once an
established right of private property no longer exists, it has taken that
property . . . ."157 Scalia rejected the assertion that the common law traditionally
allowed courts to modify property rights, calling it an "astounding" proposition.
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Id. at 715.
154.
Id.
155.
156.
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From this perspective, property law is viewed as frozen in time, perpetually the
same.
By contrast, Justice Kennedy responded that "[s]tate courts generally
operate under a common-law tradition that allows for incremental modifications to
property law," such that an incremental modification would not trigger a duty to
compensate affected owners.159 As an example, Kennedy explained that a judicial
change in the common-law rule governing liability when the roots of an owner's
tree cause damage to an adjacent property might not violate the Constitution
because "owners may reasonably expect or anticipate courts to make certain
changes in property law." 16 0 In fact, Kennedy's assertion that judges have
routinely modified property rights without violating the Constitution is fully
supported by the historical record. While rejecting the proposition that judicial
action could violate the Takings Clause, Kennedy suggested that a court would be
"on strong footing in ruling that a judicial decision that eliminates or substantially
changes established property rights, which are a legitimate expectation of the
owner," violates the Due Process Clause. 161
In short, Scalia viewed property law as static, while Stevens and Kennedy
envisioned it as at least somewhat dynamic. Under the Stevens-Kennedy
approach, legislatures and courts retain the power to alter property rights to some
extent without any payment to affected owners. 162 Taken together, Lucas and Stop
the Beach Renourishment provide helpful guidance about how to structure changes
to property law in light of the Anthropocene challenge to minimize the risk of
takings liability. Legislation and regulation should be grounded in traditional
principles of property law to the fullest extent possible. Similarly, judicial action
should focus on gradually redefining property rights by making incremental
changes in existing doctrines.

IV. RESHAPING AMERICAN PROPERTY LAW FOR THE
ANTHROPOCENE ERA
A. A New Vision of Ownership
The traditional view of property rights as rigid and absolute is obsolete in
the Anthropocene era. Consistent with the utilitarian approach that underpins
American property law, it is time to move toward a new vision of ownership,
characterized by property rights that are more flexible and less absolute. This
transition may be reflected to a certain degree in voluntary transactions, such as
where parties to a sale anticipate the future risk of Anthropocene change and
structure their relationship accordingly. Yet much of the transition will be

Id. at 736 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Five justices embraced this approach in the recent case of Murr v. Wisconsin.
137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017). Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy stressed that "[a] central
dynamic of the Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence . . is its flexibility." Id. at 1937.
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involuntary, as legislatures and courts redefine the nature and extent of property
rights, thus reducing the traditional autonomy of individual owners.
Almost 100 years ago, in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., the Supreme Court
acknowledged the need for fundamental modifications to property rights in
response to the unprecedented pressures of urbanization and population growth. 163
To paraphrase the Euclid Court, today the Anthropocene era necessitates
"additional restrictions in respect of the use and occupation of private
lands . . [that] a century ago, or even a half century ago, probably would have
4
been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive." 1 6
Perpetual property rights tied to a rigid geographic location are
counterproductive in the Anthropocene era. The stable external environment that
shaped the evolution of the infinite fee simple absolute and other property rights in
England no longer exists. In a more dynamic world, the duration and location of
property rights must be more flexible than those that evolved centuries ago.
Similarly, the notion that property rights are absolute in scope is outdated.
Granting owners the broad right to exclude others from their lands and minimizing
government regulation of land use arguably made sense in an era of stability when
conflicts between owners were rare. But today, it is an anachronism.
B. Four Principles for the Anthropocene Era
It is impossible to anticipate the precise effects that large-scale human
activities will have on the natural world a decade into the future, let alone in a
century or more. But even at this early stage, we can develop tentative principles to
reshape property law for the Anthropocene era. Inevitably, it will be necessary to
recalibrate these approaches in light of future events. But the overall theme is
likely to remain the same: a shift toward property rights that are more flexible and
less categorical.
Major legal change is difficult to implement, for reasons that are both
prudential and practical. This is particularly true when the change affects property
rights. Consistent with utilitarian theory, our legal system has long stressed the
importance of protecting property rights to give owners the confidence to invest in
improving their lands-thus facilitating economic growth. 165 Indeed, the Supreme
Court is particularly reluctant to overturn prior decisions involving property rights
because of the reliance interests that stem from those precedents. 166
Accordingly, the shift to a property law system attuned to the
Anthropocene era will be incremental and will preserve traditional doctrine to the
extent possible. Four broad principles should guide this transition: (1) equitable

163.
272 U.S. 365 (1926).
Id. at 386-87.
164.
See SPRANKLING, supra note 58, at 19-21.
165.
166.
See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877,
906 (2007) (quoting State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (observing that "reliance
on a judicial opinion is a significant reason to adhere to it . . .especially 'in cases
involving . . property rights"')).
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sharing should mitigate the right to exclude; (2) more intensive restrictions should
constrain the right to use; (3) time limits on property rights should be imposed; and
(4) geographic limits on property rights should be more flexible. The subsection
below discusses how these principles could be applied to deal with examples of
potential Anthropocene impacts.
1. Equitable Sharing Should Mitigate the Right to Exclude
More extensive sharing of resources among owners-and hence a
narrowing of the right to exclude-will be a core technique in the Anthropocene
era for confronting the use-reduction and use-elimination scenarios. 167 Major
external changes that will disrupt traditional arrangements in areas ranging from
road access to freshwater allocation can be mitigated by equitable sharing.
Presumably, market-driven approaches will be voluntarily adopted in certain
situations. But involuntary sharing will also be necessary.
Parties to consensual transactions will mitigate the risk of Anthropocene
impacts to some extent through planning. For example, if A obtains an express
access easement over B's land, A might well bargain to include the right to have
the easement relocated if it becomes unusable in the future due to flooding,
contamination, or other adverse impacts-an entitlement that we might call a
relocatable easement. Similarly, given the likelihood that in some regions,
freshwater allocations may be reduced in the Anthropocene era, the sale of water
rights may be restructured. For example, if C chooses to sell part of a water
entitlement to D, C might transfer a percentage of the entitlement to D rather than
a fixed quantity of water, so that C retains a certain amount of water for personal
use if the overall allocation is reduced.
Involuntary equitable sharing should also be utilized. Modern American
law substantially constricts the owner's traditional right to exclude in a variety of
situations without consideration. 168 Examples include limiting the landlord's
ability to reject a potential tenant, 169 overcoming the servient owner's right to
refuse an access easement, 1 7 0 and imposing a correlative-rights restriction on an
owner's ability to take subsurface water, oil, or gas. 171
One starting point would be to allow the dominant owner to relocate an
easement when Anthropocene impacts make it appropriate. The modern trend is to
allow the servient owner to relocate the route for a nonconsensual easement if this
does not lessen the easement's utility or frustrate its purpose. 1 72 In a similar
manner, where the existing route of an express or nonconsensual easement
becomes untenable due to chronic flooding or other factors, the dominant owner

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
RESTATEMENT

See discussion of these scenarios supraPart I.
See discussionsupra Section III.B.1.
See supratext accompanying notes 95-96.
See supratext accompanying notes 98-102.
See supratext accompanying notes 106-12.
M.P.M. Builders, LLC v. Dwyer, 809 N.E.2d 1053, 1058 (Mass. 2004);
(THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 4.8 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
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also should be permitted to change the location, under the same terms that govern
the servient owner's right. 173
A more controversial change would be to allow an owner to obtain a new
easement over the objection of the servient owner when Anthropocene impacts
make it appropriate. The easement by necessity traditionally arose when title to
land held in common ownership was severed, creating strict necessity-the lack of
any legal right to access a landlocked parcel over the land surface. 174 However, an
increasing number of states also recognize such an easement where it is beneficial
or convenient to the dominant owner. 1 75 The scope of this easement might be
extended so that it also arises when the necessity occurs after the severance of title.
Suppose, for example, that A subdivides his or her land into two parcels and sells
one to B at a time when B has a legal right of access over C's land to reach a public
road. If B's easement route becomes unusable due to contamination that pervades
C's entire parcel, B would be entitled to claim an easement over A's retained
land-perhaps with compensation. 176
Another approach is to restrict the ability of owners of coastal lands to
repel rising sea levels and minimize erosion by building dikes or berms around
their properties, a technique called armoring. This concept is reminiscent of the
common-enemy doctrine that many states historically applied to diffuse surface
water-an owner could exclude the water from his or her land in any manner, even
if this harmed other owners. 177 Just as states have abandoned the common-enemy
doctrine in the context of freshwater flooding, the same concept could be rejected
as applied to seawater. 178 If certain landowners are permitted to armor their lands,
this harms owners who do not armor by exacerbating the inundation of their lands.
Finally, the same equitable-sharing approach could be used to fairly
allocate the shrinking supplies of freshwater resulting from climate change that
will occur in some regions. For example, because rights to surface water in prior
appropriation states are ranked in order of priority 179-much like mortgages-a

173.
This proposal would be consistent with Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S. 164 (1979), because the servient owner has already waived her right to exclude in part
and such relocation does not wholly abrogate the right to exclude. See discussion supra
Section III.C. In the same vein, the categorical rule in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), that any permanent physical occupation authorized by
government is a taking, would not be implicated due to the servient owner's prior waiver.
More to the point, making this change through judicial action-rather than legislation or
regulation-would probably insulate it from attack based on the Takings Clause.
174.
See SPRANKLING, supra note 58, at 554-55.
175.
Id. at 556.
176.
The technique would be to redefine the scope of the easement by necessity
through judicial action, thus minimizing the risk of takings liability. See discussion supra
Section III.C.
177.
See 2 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 66, § 50.20(g).
178.
A few states have already banned or restricted such armoring. See, e.g., CAL.
PUB. RES. CODE § 30253(b) (2007); OR. ADMIN. R. 736-020-0010(6) (2017).
179.

(2016).

See A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES

§
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water shortage in a particular region does not affect all users equally: senior users
may continue to take their full shares, while junior users receive nothing. Yet
historic doctrines such as the reasonable-use restriction on surface water in riparian
states, the beneficial-use requirement on surface water in prior appropriation states,
and the correlative-rights approach to groundwater, oil, and gas all recognize that
equitable sharing of finite resources, such as water, may be appropriate. 8 0 This
approach might well be applied to ensure a more just allocation of freshwater in an
era of shortage. For example, Eric Biber suggests that water rights be altered to
"ensure minimum levels of water access for all," while Holly Doremus endorses
"restrictions on water diversion for low-value historic uses . . . .""' Goals like
these should be reached by incremental judicial redefinition of the scope of water
rights-such as narrowing the definition of beneficial use-rather than by a
wholesale reallocation of rights. 182
2. More Intensive Restrictions Should Constrain the Right to Use
More intensive land-use restrictions will be the principal approach to the
negative-externality scenario in the Anthropocene era.1 83 The current level of
regulation will be inadequate to accommodate the magnitude and pace of future
Anthropocene pressures, 1 8 4 and voluntary restrictions imposed by individual
owners, while helpful, will inevitably be insufficient." Accordingly, it will
sometimes be necessary to impose severe restrictions on land use through
government action, ideally at the local or regional level.
Government already has broad authority to minimize adverse impacts
stemming from land development, such as by regulating density and clustering
structures to avoid sensitive lands. 186 But in some situations, it will be appropriate
to prohibit many non-natural uses of land to protect people and property on or near
the land. For instance, new construction of permanent improvements should be
banned on undeveloped land that is likely to be submerged by coastal flooding
caused by climate change; inundated by freshwater flooding resulting from more
intensive rainfall; contaminated by migrating toxic waste; particularly susceptible
to increased wildfire danger; or otherwise unusually vulnerable to other

180.
See supratext accompanying notes 106-08.
181.
Eric Biber, Law in the Anthropocene Epoch 44 (UC Berkeley Public Law
Research Paper No. 2834037,
2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=2834037; Holly Doremus, Climate Change and the Evolution of Property
Rights, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REv. 1091, 1122 (2011).
182.
See discussion supra Section III.C.
183.
See discussion of this scenario supra Part I.
184.
For example, the current level of regulation would expose the homes of
almost five million Americans to inundation as sea levels rise due to global climate change.
See MELILLO ET AL., supra note 9, at 9-10.
185.
Cf Biber, supra note 181, at 27 (observing that the most effective methods to
deal with general Anthropocene impacts will involve "significant public coercion").
186.
See discussionsupra Section III.B.2.
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Anthropocene impacts. 187 Existing law would justify such a ban for lands that are
subject to the public-trust doctrine or are habitat for endangered species.' But
meaningful construction bans will require a larger geographic scope,
encompassing lands beyond these narrow categories. For example, virtually all
undeveloped land within the immediate coastal zone is subject to potential
inundation but not currently subject to public-trust or endangered-species
constraints.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court famously opined in Just v. Marinette
County that "[a]n owner of land has no absolute and unlimited right to change the
essential natural characteristic of his land so as to use it for a purpose for which it
was unsuited in its natural state and which impairs the rights of others." 1 8 9 Yet
modern law has not endorsed this principle.190 Accordingly, any construction ban
should be accompanied by carefully tailored measures that mitigate its impact on
owners to the extent reasonably possible.
Where undeveloped land likely to be subject to negative Anthropocene
impacts has viable non-intensive uses-such as farming, grazing, or recreation-a
construction ban will have only a minor impact on owners. Even where land is
suitable for intensive uses that require construction, such as housing or industry,
limited construction bans may be implemented with relative ease. For example,
where only one portion of a parcel is particularly vulnerable to Anthropocene
impacts, construction should be prohibited only on that portion.191 A more difficult
situation is where all the structures in a particular area are destroyed by an
Anthropocene impact that is likely to recur, such as widespread flooding. Here it
would be appropriate to ban any future construction to protect lives and property.
This is particularly true where the affected properties are covered by flood

187.
Any ban on new construction in coastal regions must encompass areas that
will be affected by future sea level rise. For example, the General Plan for Mendocino
County, California, provides that new structures must be set back from the edges of coastal
bluffs "a sufficient distance . . . to ensure their safety from bluff erosion and cliff retreat
during their economic life spans." MENDOCINO COUNTY GENERAL PLAN § 3.4-7 (2009). The
formula for computing the required setback distance considers the rate at which coastal
bluffs will retreat in the future due to ocean action: "Setback (meters) = Structure life
(years) x Retreat rate (meters/year)." Id.
188.
The owner of land subject to the public-trust doctrine may not utilize it in a
manner that impairs its use by the public. See SPRANKLING, supra note 58, at 534. Similarly,
the owner of land that serves as habitat for an endangered species may be unable to develop
it for non-natural uses. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a
Greater Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
189.
201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Wis. 1972).
190.
But see generally J. Peter Byrne, Green Property, 7 CONST. COMMENT. 239
(1990) (advocating an ecological approach to ownership); Eric T. Freyfogle, The Owning
and Taking of Sensitive Lands, 43 UCLAL. REv. 77 (1995) (same).
191.
For example, in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001), the
Supreme Court held that a state law protecting coastal wetlands that barred the petitioner
from building on almost all of his 18-acre parcel was not a taking because it permitted him
to construct a home on part of the land.
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insurance, such that affected owners can receive monetary compensation for their
lost opportunity to rebuild.
A more difficult scenario arises when vulnerable undeveloped land would
normally be devoted to more intensive use in the future and has no substantial nonintensive uses. 192 One mitigation technique here would be to implement a
construction ban in phases. In the first phase, for example, the law might allow a
landowner to install portable structures, such as a mobile home or a prefabricated
cabin on the property, which could be devoted to personal use for a set period
established in advance-such as five, ten, or twenty years-based on the length of
time before the land is subject to Anthropocene harms. In the second phase, the
owner would be required to remove the structures, which could not be replaced.
This phased approach would permit beneficial use of the affected land for the
maximum possible time.193
The most challenging situation is the mitigation-value scenario,1 94 where
the public interest requires that privately owned land be preserved in its natural
condition not to avoid negative externalities, but rather to mitigate general
Anthropocene impacts that would otherwise harm other properties or society in
general.195 For instance, the impact of climate change can be mitigated by
retaining forests, grasslands, and certain other lands in natural condition; these
"sinks" absorb carbon dioxide that otherwise would contribute to climate
change.196 A local ordinance requiring that the privately owned forests in a region
be preserved in perpetuity might well eliminate all viable uses and thus constitute a
taking. 1 97 Laws that safeguard mitigation-value land from development should be

192.
In Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), for instance, the
Supreme Court suggested that a regulation that eliminated all beneficial use would be a
taking, unless justified by background principles of property or nuisance law. However, as
the Court subsequently noted in Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017), in regulatory
takings cases "it may be relevant that [at the time of purchase] the property is located in an
area that is subject to, or likely to become subject to, environmental or other regulation." Id.
at 1945-46; see discussion supra Section III.C.
193.
This approach might well avoid takings liability under the Lucas test,
because no amortization-like period was provided in that situation. See discussion supra
Section III.C.
194.
See discussion of this scenario supra Part I.
195.
This scenario produces the same effect that the federal Endangered Species
Act already has on certain properties. It is undisputed that the government has the inherent
power, as a general matter, to prohibit any change in the natural condition of privately
owned lands. As Justice Scalia observed in his dissent in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Communitiesfor a Greater Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 714 (1995), the majority's interpretation
of the Act may "impose[] unfairness . . upon the simplest farmer who finds his land
conscripted to national zoological use."
196.
See Imke Sagemtiller, Forest Sinks under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol: Opportunity or Risk for
Biodiversity?, 31 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 189, 194-200 (2006).

197.
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7 (suggesting that a regulation that required an
owner to leave 90% of a "rural tract in its natural state" would be a taking of the affected
portion).
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adopted more broadly, ideally at the regional level to avoid the problem of
piecemeal regulation. At the same time, these laws must be carefully tailored to
avoid eliminating all viable uses on an affected parcel.198
3. Time Limits on PropertyRights Should Be Imposed
Limiting the duration of property rights in the Anthropocene era offers
substantial benefits in certain situations. It may provide greater flexibility in light
of changing external conditions, allocate resources efficiently, and potentially help
to safeguard owner expectations, particularly in the use-reduction and useelimination scenarios.199 One market-oriented approach would be to legitimatize a
new time-limited freehold estate. More importantly, it will be appropriate to
impose involuntary time limits under narrow circumstances.
Inevitably, increasing market uncertainty will surround the purchase of
particular lands in the future. For example, buyers might be reluctant to purchase
property that may be subject to future desertification or inundation. In this setting,
it may be beneficial to expand the use of voluntary time limits.20 0 For example,
legislatures or courts could permit parties to create a time-limited form of fee
simple absolute, which might be called fee simple finite.20 1 This would be a
freehold estate that lasts for a period of years-e.g., 50 years-that is agreed upon
in advance, something of a hybrid between the fee simple absolute and the term of
years tenancy. 202 When the term ends, the seller regains title. Such an estate might
include the buyer's option to renew it for one or more terms in return for a
payment made pursuant to a formula agreed on in advance. The fee simple finite
would effectively shift the risk of value loss caused by future Anthropocene
changes from the buyer to the seller, thus facilitating transactions. Government
approval of this new estate would be crucial to allowing sellers, buyers, lenders,
203
insurers, and other participants in the land sales market to accept the innovation.
Formal acceptance of the fee simple finite would be consistent with the
traditional policy favoring freedom of disposition, which respects the autonomy of
property owners to transfer their lands as they wish.20 The principal objection to
this concept would be the numerus clausus principle which seeks to restrict the
creation of new forms of property rights in the interest of efficiency, mainly to
198.
See discussion supra Section III.C.
199.
See discussion of these scenarios supraPart I.
200.
Voluntarily created, time-limited interests are common in property law. See
generally TIME-LIMITED INTERESTS IN LAND (Cornelius van der Merwe & Alain-Laurent
Verbeke eds., 2012).
201.
Cf. Lee Anne Fennell, Fee Simple Obsolete, 91 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1457, 148286 (2016) (proposing the "callable fee," a time-limited fee simple that could be terminated
by the seller over the buyer's objection, to facilitate urban redevelopment).
202.
It would be impractical to use the term of years tenancy for this purpose due
to lack of market acceptance. Buyers, sellers, insurers, lenders, and other market
participants are accustomed to transactions involving freehold estates, not leases.
203.
See Fennell, supra note 201, at 1505-08 (discussing the need for government
approval of new freehold estates).
204.
See SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 94, at 27.
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minimize transaction costs. 2 0 5 Yet today almost all land in the United States is held
in fee simple absolute, with a small amount held in absolute life estates. 2 0 6
Defeasible freehold estates and defeasible life estates in land are vanishing
species. 2 0 7 In this setting, the costs of recognizing one new type of fee simple
estate would be negligible.
Involuntary time limits will also be a helpful tool under certain
circumstances, when constitutionally and politically feasible. American law has
long recognized that limits may be imposed on the duration of property rights for
policy reasons in certain situations over the objection of an affected owner,
without payment of compensation. 2 08 Examples of this technique include adverse
2 11
21 0
and
amortization of nonconforming uses,
possession,209 marketable title acts,
212
the changed-conditions defense to enforcement of restrictive covenants.
One approach would be to adopt time-limited zoning ordinances at the
local level-by analogy to the amortization approach to eliminate nonconforming
uses-that terminate the property rights of affected owners after an extended
period, especially in the use-elimination scenario. Such an approach may survive
constitutional scrutiny because it is not an immediate transfer of title and would be
utilized under conditions in which the land value is either zero or almost zero. 2 13
This approach would both prevent future negative impacts that harm other owners
and preserve public funds that would otherwise be used to provide emergency
services to the few holdout owners who might remain.
For instance, where chronic flooding caused by intensified storm activity
largely devastates a residential area and these conditions will recur, it may be
appropriate for the city to both prohibit rebuilding the destroyed homes and allow
the owners of unaffected homes to occupy them for a specified period before
terminating their titles. Alternatively, imagine an agricultural region that has
become almost unsuitable for farming, its only potential use, due to increasing
toxic contamination or desertification. Here the county might permit continued use
of the lands for a set period before terminating the titles of affected owners. In
each situation, the owners retain the opportunity to benefit from their lands for a
longer time, just as in the classic amortization situation where, for example, the
owner of a nonconforming billboard can use it for perhaps three to five more
years. This approach honors the good-faith expectations of property purchasers:
that they will be allowed to benefit from their lands to some extent-and certainly
205.
See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal
Standardizationin the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L. REv.

1 (2000).
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

See SPRANKLING, supra note 58, at 115, 121.

Id. at 130.
See discussion supra Section JJJ.B.3.
See SPRANKLING, supra note 58, at 466-77.
See supratext accompanying note 130.
See supratext accompanying note 131.
See supratext accompanying note 132.

213.
See discussion supra Section III.C. Alternatively, such a technique might
require a modification of current takings doctrine. See discussion infra Section IV.C.
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more than if an immediate confiscation occurred. In each situation, government
would now be able to manage and preserve the affected lands to avoid spillover
effects on other parcels. Government would also be free from the burden of
providing services such as emergency or long-term medical care for holdout
owners who are injured, for example, by flooding or by toxic substances.
Another approach would be to eventually terminate property rights in the
use-elimination scenario where the strength of the owner's connection to the
property has waned over time to the point where it is essentially nonexistent, by
analogy to doctrines such as adverse possession and marketable-title acts. For
example, this technique might be used to end an estate in coastal land that is
becoming submerged due to rising sea levels. As coastal land is gradually
transformed into seabed, it initially becomes subject to the ebb and flow of the
tides and is accordingly governed by the public-trust doctrine which greatly
curtails an owner's rights. 2 14 Once inundation is complete, title is transferred to the
state under the doctrine of accretion.215
Under the public-trust doctrine, partially inundated lands are subject to a
servitude held by the sovereign, such that the public may use them for commerce,
fishing, navigation, and other purposes. 2 1 6 The doctrine effectively prevents the
owner from utilizing such land as an owner normally would because this would
interfere with the protected public uses. 2 1 7 As a practical matter, the owner's
entitlement in this situation has no substantive content; for example, the owner
cannot exclude others or sell the title because it is largely worthless. 2 18 Indeed, the
property may have negative value because the owner is still subject to potential
personal-injury liability, for instance, if a member of the public is injured by part
of a submerged structure. As a matter of property theory, at some point an owner
can lose so many of the rights that constitute property that he or she no longer
owns any "property." 2 1 9 This doctrine may apply to such submerged land through
accretion even in advance of the transfer of title. In any event, where
Anthropocene era changes clearly leave land with no value the public-trust
doctrine might be extended to provide that any residual title in the owner has been
terminated. This will both facilitate government management of such lands on a

214.

See, e.g., Michaelson v. Silver Beach Improvement Ass'n, 173 N.E.2d 273,

280 (Mass. 1961) (indicating that the area of privately owned land above the low-water
mark, but below the high-water mark, is subject to the public trust doctrine).
215.
See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971) (noting that the
boundary line between state ownership and private ownership is the mean high-tide line,
which can shift over time).
216.
For example, in California the public trust also encompasses uses such as
swimming, wildlife habitat, and scientific study. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court,

658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983).
217.
See SPRANKLING, supra note 58, at 534.
218.
Owners of land subject to the public-trust doctrine cannot exclude the public
from its use. Id. Accordingly, while they are free to use the land themselves, their rights as
owners are no greater than the rights of the general public, so logically their rights would
have little or no value.
219.
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY§ 10cmt. c (1936).
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regional basis to avoid negative externalities and minimize the litigation costs
inherent in eminent-domain proceedings.
4. GeographicLimits on PropertyRights Should Be More Flexible
Greater flexibility in the geographic location of property entitlements may
be useful in the Anthropocene era. In the use-reduction and use-elimination
scenarios,220 a partial or total shift in the location of the land surface subject to the
entitlement can be an appropriate tool to allocate resources equitably and minimize
disruption. In addition, continuing the modern trend of shrinking the airspace and
subsurface components of ownership may help to minimize negative externalities.
Although the voluntary use of location flexibility devices may prove useful in the
marketplace to a degree, it is likely that involuntary changes will be necessary.
In the context of facilitating urban growth, Lee Anne Fennell urges the
recognition of the floating fee, a fee simple estate that "is not immutably moored to
a fixed set of geographic coordinates, but instead represents a portable claim over
equivalent property. "221 Under this proposal, a resident holding a floating fee could
be forced to move-over his or her objection-to a new property. The reverse
approach might be used to minimize Anthropocene era impacts. The parties to a
sales transaction who wish to shift the risk of loss in the use-reduction scenario
from the buyer to the seller could utilize such an estate, particularly if the seller
owns a sufficiently large portfolio of fungible properties. For example, under this
approach, a buyer who concludes that the region around his or her condominium
has become subject to unacceptable long-term risks of contamination, disease,
tornadoes, or wildfires could choose to transfer the floating fee to another
condominium that the seller owns in a different region. 2 2 2
Involuntary changes in the surface location of property entitlements
should also be considered, by analogy to other relocation doctrines in property
law. 2 23 For example, the contemporary doctrines governing land boundaries that
effectively implement such location changes might be expanded to facilitate a
forced land swap between two owners. Owners of adjoining rural parcels might
both be better off by exchanging portions of their lands in the use-reduction
scenario, based on the topography of contaminated or flooded portions of their
respective lands. If the owners were both rational maximizers, they would agree to
the exchange; but imagine instead that one owner irrationally objects. In this
situation, the law should be able to impose an exchange at the request of the other
owner. 224 Similarly, just as a boundary line traditionally moves with accretion, it

220.

See discussion of these scenarios supraPart I.

221.
Fennell, supra note 201, at 1490.
222.
The main potential objection to this approach is the numerus clausus
doctrine. See Section JV.B.3, supra, which addresses this objection in the analogous context
of the proposed fee simple finite.
223.
See discussionsupra Section IJ.B.4.
224.
This might trigger concern under the public-use component of the Takings

Clause. As the Supreme Court noted in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477
(2005), government may not "take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to
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may be appropriate to recognize that it also shifts in response to other gradual and
unforeseen shifts in the external environment, such as changes in the location of
groundwater basins, if this does not cause substantial adverse impacts on adjacent
owners.
Additionally, the nuisance doctrine might be used in the negativeexternality scenario to shift title to all or part of a parcel to government,
particularly where the owner is unresponsive or unknown.225 For example, under
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
the government is authorized to enter private land to remediate hazardous
substance contamination. 226 Where such contamination poses a long-term threat to
adjacent properties and the owner fails to act after due notice, the land could be
declared a common-law nuisance to allow a government entity to obtain title to the
land so it can effectively manage the threat on a regional basis.22 7 A similar
approach might be utilized where all or part of a parcel produces severe,
uncontrolled nuisance-like impacts such as flooding or hazardous dust.
Finally, the modern trend of shrinking the vertical dimensions of
ownership should continue. Owners should no longer be permitted to utilize the
airspace above the land surface for airborne waste disposal, except in extreme
circumstances. In a similar manner, it would be desirable to reduce the downward
extent of property ownership, perhaps to a set distance such as 1,000 feet, which
would accommodate virtually all surface uses and simultaneously allow concerted
management of subsurface contamination.2 2 8
C. Reinterpreting the Takings Clause for the Anthropocene Era
Based on current doctrine, there is a substantial risk that major
readjustment of property rights would violate the Takings Clause, unless permitted
by the logic of Lucas 2 2 9 or Stop the Beach Renourishment.23 0 Ultimately, it may be
necessary to reappraise takings jurisprudence in light of the Anthropocene
challenge. As we shift from a relatively stable world to one characterized by
massive and rapid shifts in the external environment, the Supreme Court's

another private party B, even though A is paid just compensation" because this is not a
public use. However, this proposal can comply with the public-use test if it is adopted as
part of a comprehensive program intended to facilitate the use of land on a regional or
statewide basis, rather than one that solely concerns two particular owners.
225.
See discussion of this scenario supra Part I.
226.
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2012).
227.
This would require a modification to current takings doctrine to avoid the
rule in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), that any
permanent physical occupation authorized by government is a categorical taking.
228.
See generally Sprankling, supra note 70, at 1032-38. This could be
accomplished by judicial action over time, which would minimize the risk of taking
liability. See discussion supra Section III.C.
229.
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
230.
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S.
702 (2010).
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interpretation of the Takings Clause may well evolve toward a more flexible and
less absolutist vision of property rights. 2 3 1
As Justice Holmes explained in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,
"[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property
could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general
law." 2 3 2 This is particularly true in the Anthropocene era. The magnitude of
government readjustment of property rights that becomes necessary in the future
might well be so large that full payment is impossible. As it becomes necessary to
rethink our foundational assumptions about the takings doctrine, two themes are
helpful: (1) the reasonable expectations of owners; and (2) the emergency
exception.
First, the existence of a taking is determined-to some extent-by the
reasonable expectations of property owners. This theme initially surfaced in Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, where the Court adopted a new
three-factor test for determining whether a taking had occurred; 2 3 3 it explained that
one of the relevant factors was "the extent to which the regulation has interfered
with distinct investment-backed expectations . . . ."234 In the same vein, the Court's
later opinion in Lucas observed that the test for defining the parcel subject to the
Takings Clause stemmed from "how the owner's reasonable expectations have
been shaped by the State's law of property . . . ."235 Concurring in Lucas, Justice
Kennedy stressed that "[t]he expectations protected by the Constitution are based
on objective rules and customs that can be understood as reasonable by all parties
involved . . . in light of the whole of our legal tradition." 2 3 6 He observed that "[t]he
State should not be prevented from enacting new regulatory initiatives in response
237
to changing conditions."
This analysis might suggest that government could evade takings liability
by enacting legislation that weakens property rights-and thereby lowers the
reasonable expectations of future owners. But writing for the majority in Palazzolo
v. Rhode Island, Kennedy rejected the argument that "by prospective legislation
the State can shape and define property rights . .. and subsequent owners cannot
claim any injury from lost value. After all, they purchased or took title with notice
of the limitation." 2 38 Nonetheless, as Justice O'Connor observed in her concurring
opinion, the lack of reasonable expectations is still an important component in the

231.
would apply
change).
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Cf Byrne, supra note 145, at 85-108 (discussing how the Takings Clause
to various regulatory responses to rising sea levels produced by climate
260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
Id.
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992).
Id. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id.
533 U.S. 606, 626 (2001).
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takings inquiry: "the regulatory regime in place at the time the claimant acquires
the property at issue helps to shape the reasonableness of those expectations." 2 3 9
As government responds to the cascading impacts of the Anthropocene
era, it seems likely that virtually all owners will reasonably anticipate that the
nature and scope of their property rights will be limited by future laws, regulations,
and decisions. In particular, owners who purchase their properties after widespread
Anthropocene impacts become apparent may not be successful in claiming that
they had any reasonable expectation of avoiding future legal controls. For
example, today it is broadly understood that rising sea levels threaten to inundate
many coastal properties.2 4 0 Public knowledge about the magnitude of this risk will
expand as sea levels rise and new restrictions on coastal construction are imposed.
At some point, a person who purchases an undeveloped ocean-front lot will not be
able to convincingly assert that he or she had a reasonable expectation of being
able to build a home on the land. Under the O'Connor approach, this would
substantially reduce the likelihood that such an owner could establish a
compensable taking because the expectation would be unreasonable. Indeed, even
Kennedy would presumably concede that government must be able to adopt new
legislation and regulations in "response to changing conditions" stemming from
24 1
Anthropocene impacts without paying compensation.
Second, it is well-settled that government is not obligated to compensate
under the Takings Clause when it intentionally destroys property in an emergency.
This rule arises most commonly where the purpose of the destruction is to prevent
the spread of fire to other properties. 2 4 2 But it has also been applied in other
situations, such as preventing disease 2 43 or ensuring that valuable property is not
captured by a wartime enemy.24 4 As the Supreme Court observed in Lucas,

239.
Id. at 633 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In Murr v. Wisconsin, the Court
embraced Justice O'Connor's approach. 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017) Writing for the majority,
Justice Kennedy observed that "[a] reasonable restriction that predates a landowner's
acquisition . . can be one of the objective factors that most landowners would reasonably
consider in forming fair expectations about their property." Id. at 1945. He explained that
"[i]n particular, it may be relevant that the property is located in an area that is . . likely to
become subject to . . environmental . . regulation." Id. at 1945-46.
240.
See MELILLO ET AL., supra note 9, at 9-10.
241.
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Subsequently, in Murr,
Justice Kennedy returned to this flexibility theme in his majority opinion. He explained that
the Court's regulatory taking jurisprudence sought to "reconcile two competing objectives":
"the individual's right to retain the interests and exercise the freedoms at the core of private
property ownership" and "the government's well-established power to 'adjust rights for the
public good."' Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1943 (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979)).
He concluded that "adjudicating regulatory takings cases" required "a proper balancing of
these principles." Id.
242.
See, e.g., United States v. Pacific R.R., 120 U.S. 227, 238-39 (1887). See
generally Brian Angelo Lee, Emergency Takings, 114 MICH. L. REv. 391 (2015).
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destruction to save buildings from fire or "to forestall other grave threats to the
lives and property of others" is an exception to takings liability.245
The scope of the emergency exception could be expanded beyond the
destruction of tangible items to also encompass the modification or destruction of
property rights, at least where lives and property are at risk. The principal
difficulty with this approach is the need to revise the definition of necessitywhich typically connotes an unforeseen and immediate need-so that it
encompasses negative impacts that are anticipated and may emerge gradually. 6
Yet the core logic underpinning the exception is the government's inability to fully
compensate owners due to the scale of the emergency, a rationale which applies
equally to long-term Anthropocene impacts.
Alternatively, Brian Angelo Lee proposes the concept of fiscalnoncompensation necessity, which "arises when limitations on the relevant party's
available wealth restrict its ability to pay full compensation."24 7 This approach
responds to Justice Holmes' Pennsylvania Coal dictum that government is
practically unable to compensate owners on every occasion when its actions affect
property value. In this situation, Lee argues that partial compensation may still be
4
appropriate to the extent that it is fiscally possible.m
Local governments, in
particular, may be unable to respond to Anthropocene impacts under some
circumstances due to fiscal constraints-full compensation to landowners might
literally force them into bankruptcy. Such a modified approach to compensation
would be necessary for these governments to meet their duty to safeguard the
public.
CONCLUSION
The Anthropocene era marks a profound transition in the relationship
between humanity and the planet. Humans have replaced nature as the dominant
force transforming the Earth. This reality will necessitate a variety of major social,
cultural, economic, and other changes, including conceptual changes to our
traditional view of property rights.
Today, at the dawn of the Anthropocene era, it is impossible to fully
anticipate how human-caused changes will alter the planet in the future. Indeed,
based on recent history, the scale and intensity of change are likely to accelerate. It
would be premature to speculate about how this process will affect specific
property doctrines. At this point, however, we can predict that property law will

245.

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 n.16.

246.
This approach is supported by the Court's interpretation of the Takings
Clause in Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 277 (1928). The case involved a statute requiring
the destruction of red cedar trees that could spread a plant disease called cedar rust, which
could threaten local apple orchards. The Court upheld the statute despite the absence of any
imminent harm, explaining that "the state does not exceed its constitutional powers by
deciding upon the destruction of one class of property in order to save another which, in the
judgment of the legislature, is of greater value to the public." Id. at 279.
247.
Lee, supra note 242, at 406.
248.
Id. at 409-10.
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evolve in response to the Anthropocene challenge by moving toward a more
dynamic system. The rigid and absolutist approach to property rights, which still
largely prevails in American property law, must be replaced by new standards
based on property rights that are both more flexible and less categorical. The
overarching principles discussed above-potentially supplemented by modified
Takings Clause jurisprudence-will help guide this evolution.

